Angus A2A GP Inc. v. Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc.

(Alberta)

2024 ABKB 769

2025 ABKB 51

2025 ABCA 147 (granting leave to appeal in part)

2026 ABCA 156

Can equity investors initiate CCAA proceedings against a group of affiliated cross-border entities?

Yes (subject to appeal).

A group of Canadian investors in real estate projects in Ontario and Texas discovered the Ontario project was being sold without their consent so they commenced CCAA proceedings in Alberta to stop the sale and have a Monitor appointed. The Court granted a temporary order halting the sale and appointed a Monitor, with the order later recognized in the US.

The project entities, including Texas LLCs, challenged the orders, arguing improper process and lack of jurisdiction.

The Alberta Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on the following two questions:

1. Was the CCAA properly used by the investors?

2. Are the Texas-based entities subject to the CCAA?

On May 11, 2026, the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and confirmed the Initial Order granted under the CCAA. The Court found, among other things, that:

1. Equity investors may commence CCAA proceedings, where there is a reasonable possibility that the debtor company is cash-flow insolvent and has total assets exceeding non-equity claims, such that the investors could potentially benefit from the proceedings. The Court recognized, however, that it may be difficult for equity investors to establish standing.

2. Foreign non-debtor companies may be subjected to the CCAA orders. Section 3(1) of the CCAA operates as a trigger for the CCAA's application, not a limit on the court's authority under section 11 or other provisions of the CCAA. Once the threshold is meet (i.e., there is a debtor company or affiliated debtor companies against which claims exceed $5 million), the CCAA applies and the powers thereunder are vested in the supervising court. The supervising court’s authority is not limited orders against the debtor companies only.

The Court of Appeal left open the question of which factors or principles should guide the exercise of authority to make orders against foreign-incorporated non-debtor companies, as the issue was not raised.

The time period for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has lapsed. Leave was not sought.

RPG Receivables Purchase Group Inc. v. American Pacific Corporation

(Ontario)

2025 ONCA 371

SCC Case No. 41937

Were payments made by an insolvent company to its major supplier void as preferences when the Debtor claims they were justified by the intention to stay in business?

Yes (subject to appeal pending before the Supreme Court of Canada).

Specialty Chemical Industries Inc. (“Specialty”) paid USD $400,000 to one of its major suppliers, American Pacific Corporation (“AmPac”), one month before assigning itself into bankruptcy.

Specialty’s trustee in bankruptcy was unsuccessful in its claim to recover the amounts from AmPac and assigned its right of action to a creditor under section 38 of the BIA.

The lower court found that Specialty made the payments to keep its only customer and stay in business, which rebutted the presumption of a preference.

The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed, finding no objective evidence that the payments would actually save Specialty’s business, and noted that the quantum of the payments was much greater than any benefit Specialty might have received. It therefore found the payments were void as preferences and must be repaid by AmPac.

On March 26, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal. The Insolvency Institute of Canada was granted leave to intervene. The appeal is scheduled be heard on December 4, 2026.

YG Limited Partnership and YSL Residences Inc. (Re)

In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, et al. v. Maria Athanasoulis

(Ontario)

2024 ONSC 1617

2025 ONCA 591

SCC Case No. 42039

Is a claim made under a profit sharing agreement a provable claim under the BIA as it sounds in equity rather than debt?

No (subject to leave to appeal).

A former employee of the debtor appealed the decision of the Trustee that disallowed her profit-sharing claim on the basis that: (i) it was a claim in the nature of equity rather than debt, and (ii) that was too contingent and remote.

The lower court allowed the employee’s appeal, finding that the profit-sharing claim was not a claim in equity, but is instead a claim for unliquidated damages for breach of her employment contract, and that her claim was not contingent or too remote.

The Trustee appealed the lower court’s decisions to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

In dismissing the appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that:

1. the definition of “equity claim” under the BIA is meant to be exhaustive and identifies the types of claims that may arise from an equity interest; and

2. the origin of an equity claim is to be limited to an ownership interest in a corporation.

Applying this framework, the Court rejected the Trustee’s submission that a profit‑sharing entitlement tied to project performance is “in substance” a claim in the nature of equity, not debt. The Court found that the employee held no shares or partnership units and her claim arose from a contractual term of employment, not from any ownership interest. Tying the quantum to employer performance (profits net of certain expenses, including LP repayments) does not convert a contractual obligation into an equity claim.

The Court cautioned that characterization of a claim under the BIA should not be results‑driven and that concerns about perceived unfairness in insolvency priority cannot override the statutory definitions.

The Trustee applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. On July 30, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the application.

Autorité des marchés financiers v. Valeo Pharma inc.

(Québec)

2024 QCCS 3636

2024 QCCA 1741 (granting leave to appeal)

2025 QCCA 103 (granting the Ontario Securities Commission leave to intervene)

Does a CCAA Court have jurisdiction to exempt a reporting issuer from continuous disclosure obligations and other requirements under provincial securities law?

Yes (subject to appeal).

Valeo Pharma Inc. (“Valeo”) was a reporting issuer in Ontario and filed for CCAA protection. In issuing the Initial Order, and subsequently, the Amended and Restated Initial Order, the Québec Superior Court granted exemptions from continuous disclosure obligations and audit committee requirements to Valeo and its affiliates.

The Autorité des marchés financiers (“AMF”), the Québec securities regulator, was granted leave to appeal to the Québec Court of Appeal. The AMF challenges the validity of the exemptions, arguing that they:

1. infringe on its exclusive jurisdiction and authority to regulate reporting issuers and protect investors; and

2. are contrary to the public interest and the objectives of the CCAA.

The AMF contends that the Québec Superior Court erred in applying the doctrine of federal paramountcy to override provincial securities laws.

The Ontario Securities Commission and Insolvency Institute of Canada were granted leave to intervene in the appeal, which was heard on October 29, 2025. The decision is under reserve.

Attorney General of Canada c. Valeo Pharma inc.

(Québec)

2025 QCCS 580

2025 QCCA 483 (granting the Attorney General of Canada leave to appeal)

2025 QCCA 969 (granting leave to intervene to the Insolvency Institute of Canada)

Does transferring non-retained employees to a shell company for the purpose of terminating their employment and enabling them to claim WEPPA benefits constitute an abuse or circumvention of the WEPPA regime?

No (subject to appeal).

In a separate action regarding the Valeo restructuring, through a court-supervised restructuring transaction, Valeo sought to retain 36 of its 60 employees, while the remaining 24 would have their salary and vacation benefits paid before being transferred to a shell company (“ResidualCo”), which would then terminate their employment. Applications would then be made for these terminated employees to receive benefits under the federal Wage Earner Protection Program Act (“WEPPA”).

The Attorney General of Canada objected, arguing that the transfer to ResidualCo was a legal fiction to allow employees to claim WEPPA benefits in a manner inconsistent with the program’s intent. The Québec Superior Court rejected these arguments and approved the transaction.

The Attorney General then sought, and was granted, leave to appeal to the Québec Court of Appeal, arguing that the lower court’s interpretation of WEPPA was contrary to the statute’s wording and objectives.

The Insolvency Institute of Canada was granted leave to intervene in the appeal, which was heard September 30, 2025. The decision is under reserve.

Compeer Financial PCA v. Sunterra Farms Ltd.

(Alberta)

2026 ABCA 125

SCC Case No. 42408

Is a decision determining fraudulent misrepresentation claims “made under” the CCAA such that leave to appeal is required?

Yes, where the fraudulent misrepresentation claims were advanced in conjunction with a request for declarations under the CCAA.

The debtor companies obtained an initial order under the CCAA. One of its lenders commenced a separate action advancing claims of fraudulent misrepresentation against the debtor companies and certain individual defendants. The lender sought declarations under the CCAA that its claims could not be compromised or arranged in the CCAA proceedings without its consent. The lender brought a summary judgment application, which was granted against the debtor companies and one individual defendant, but dismissed against the remaining individual defendants. The chambers judge found that those defendants were not personally liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. The lender sought to appeal as of right from this portion of the decision.

The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the lender required leave to appeal because the chambers judge’s decision was “made under” the CCAA. Among other reasons, the determination was in furtherance of the CCAA proceeding by determining the quantum and character of the lender’s claims. Further, having chosen to invoke the CCAA to obtain declaratory relief that its claims were non-compromisable, the lender must also accept the CCAA requirement for leave to appeal. The lender conceded that it could not meet the CCAA leave test, and leave to appeal was dismissed.

The debtor companies and the individual defendant who were found liable for fraudulent misrepresentation had also sought to appeal from the chambers judge’s decision. The Court of Appeal similarly held that they required leave to appeal, and that leave was denied.

On June 22, 2026, these parties applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. As of August 24, 2026, the application for leave to appeal remains pending.

KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. Mapleview Developments Ltd.

(Ontario)

2026 ONCA 512

In a receivership priority dispute under s. 78(2) of the Construction Act, is a deficiency in statutory holdbacks calculated against 10% of all invoices or only 10% of unpaid invoices?

Only 10% of unpaid invoices, where there are no subcontractor lien claims.

The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision that where there are no subcontractor lien claims and a payer has fully paid invoices from a contractor, there is no deficiency in the holdbacks related to those fully paid services or materials.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that if an invoice has been paid in full and there is no other lien claimant, no lien remains unsatisfied in respect of that invoice. Calculating the deficiency on all invoices would produce double recovery because the contractor would receive the same 10% holdback amount once through full payment and again through priority over the building mortgagee.

More generally, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the Construction Act is intended to balance the interests of lien claimants, owners, contractors, subcontractors, and mortgagees rather than to favour lien claimants categorically.

As of August 24, 2026, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has not been sought.

Aquino (Re)

(Ontario)

2026 ONCA 132

Can a CCAA monitor bring a bankruptcy application as a judgment creditor?

Is a bankruptcy order appealable as of right?

Can a Mareva injunction survive the automatic stay triggered by a bankruptcy order?

Yes to all three questions.

The CCAA monitor of Bondfield Construction Company Limited obtained a judgment of over $27.4 million against Bondfield's former president arising from a false invoicing scheme. The Monitor applied for a bankruptcy order and sought to preserve a pre-existing Mareva injunction. The bankruptcy judge granted both orders.

The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that:

1. A CCAA monitor authorized to pursue litigation and obtain judgment has incidental authority to commence a bankruptcy application as a judgment creditor, without needing further court approval. This streamlines enforcement for monitors pursuing fraud recoveries.

2. A bankruptcy order is appealable as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA where it is substantive and results in a loss by vesting the debtor's property in a trustee. Debtors subject to bankruptcy applications should be aware that an appeal triggers an automatic stay.

3. A Mareva injunction can survive a bankruptcy order. The bankruptcy judge effectively exercised the power under s. 69.4 of the BIA to declare that the stay did not apply. Creditors seeking to preserve pre-existing asset-freezing relief through a bankruptcy should consider requesting an express s. 69.4 order at the time of the bankruptcy application.

4. The BIA definition of "insolvent person" is disjunctive — satisfying either prong (a) or (b) is sufficient regardless of balance sheet position. A debtor's claim to hold valuable assets does not defeat a bankruptcy application where current obligations are not being met.

The time period for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has lapsed. Leave was not sought.

Avida 2015 Inc. (Re)

(Ontario)

2026 ONCA 426

Can a secured creditor use a credit bid to purchase a cause of action against itself at a bankruptcy auction sale?

Not settled (leave to appeal granted).

Avida 2015 Inc. was in default to the bank who sought the appointment of a receiver and subsequently, a trustee. A director asked the trustee to sue the bank for breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. The trustee refused. The director sought to pursue the action himself under s. 38 of the BIA. The bank then sought to purchase the potential cause of action against itself at auction via a credit bid.

The motion judge directed the auction process and suggested that the bank could credit bid some or all of its debt. The director sought to appeal, taking the position that the chose in action which Avida had against the Bank could not be subject to the Bank’s security and so the Bank could not credit bid.

The Ontario Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, holding that while credit bidding is well-established, a creditor's entitlement to credit-bid on an asset that is not included in its security is not well-settled. CAIRP and the Insolvency Institute of Canada have sought leave to intervene in this appeal.

GEC (Richmond) GP Inc. v. MNP Ltd.

(British Columbia)

2025 BCCA 332 (judgment on appeal)

2026 BCCA 240 (denying leave to appeal the AVO)

Can a CCAA court approve a credit bid transaction where the amount of the creditor's claim remains in dispute due to ongoing litigation?

Is a construction lender's funding commitment enforceable independently of a failed syndication condition?

Yes to the credit bid (leave to appeal denied). Yes to the lender commitment (reversed on appeal; damages to be assessed).

Romspen Investment Corporation provided construction financing for a $726 million, seven-tower development in Richmond, BC. After advancing approximately $143.6 million, Romspen ceased funding when it was unable to syndicate the balance of a $422 million loan. The developers sought CCAA protection. Two court-supervised sales processes failed to generate viable bids.

On appeal of the liability trial (2025 BCCA 332), the BC Court of Appeal found Romspen's $212 million "lender commitment" was a binding obligation independent of syndication, and that ceasing advances breached the loan agreement. The declaration of default was set aside and damages were remitted for assessment. The Court upheld findings that Romspen acted in good faith in its syndication efforts.

Notwithstanding the outstanding litigation including a damages assessment trial scheduled for a few months later, the Monitor applied for an Approval and Vesting Order to transfer the property to Romspen by credit bid. The CCAA judge approved the transaction as the only option to preserve value, finding it satisfied the requirements under ss. 11 and 36 of the CCAA.

The developers and GEC (which had invested a $60 million deposit and held security subordinate to Romspen) sought leave to appeal. The BC Court of Appeal (2026 BCCA 240) denied leave, holding that:

1. A high degree of deference is owed to the CCAA supervising judge, who applied the well-established framework under ss. 11 and 36 of the CCAA.

2. An undetermined equitable set-off defence does not preclude a credit bid where the creditor's advances are undisputed and it holds first-priority security. The developers' set-off defence was preserved for trial.

3. Granting leave would unduly hinder the CCAA proceedings, given $200,000/month in site preservation costs, $5 million/month in accruing interest on secured debt, and the risk of catastrophic value destruction.

On August 20, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Romspen's application for leave to appeal the 2025 BCCA 332 decision on the lender commitment issue. A damages trial is scheduled for October 2026.

Invico Diversified Income Limited Partnership v. NewGrange Energy Inc.

(Alberta)

2024 ABKB 214

2024 ABCA 244 (granting leave to appeal)

2025 ABCA 392

Are gross overriding royalties (“GORs”) interests in land that cannot be “vested out”, (i.e., removed from title) in a Reverse Vesting Order (an “RVO”)?

In this case, no, although the analysis is fact-specific. GORs can constitute an interest which “runs with the land” or they can simply be a contractual interest.

In this case, the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta found that the GORs were not interests in land and therefore could be vested out in an RVO. The Court declined to consider whether, if the GORs were interests in land, they could still be vested out in an RVO.

In determining the royalty interests did not “run with the land”, the Court examined the intentions of the parties. Despite language in the royalty agreement purporting to create an interest in the land, the language in the royalty assignment clause and the surrounding factual circumstances indicated otherwise.

NewGrange Energy Inc. (the holder of the GORs) sought and was granted leave to appeal. On November 25, 2025, the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and made several findings, including:

1. The assignment clause was inconsistent with an interest in land since the clause contemplated situations in which the original royalty payor would remain liable to pay the royalty even if it no longer held an interest in the land.

2. This case is distinguishable from other cases in which a similar assignment clause did not defeat a finding of an interest in land since the factual context is different.

3. Even if the parties had intended to create an interest in land, the gross overriding royalty was created before the royalty grantor acquired an interest in the land and a grantor cannot convey what it does not have.

The time period for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has lapsed. Leave was not sought.

Cleo Energy Corp. (Re)

(Alberta)

2025 ABKB 621

Is purchaser preference enough to justify the necessity of an RVO?

In this case, no.

The Receiver’s assertions about material risk, delay, and cost of licence transfers were unsubstantiated by specific, cogent evidence. Further, the Receiver’s application did not prove why the sale could not be completed through a plan of arrangement and what corporate attributes could only be preserved through an RVO. A purchaser’s preference for an RVO is not enough to justify its necessity. As a result, the Court rejected the Receiver’s application for an RVO.

The Court also considered if an RVO can be used to retain Crown mineral leases while shedding pre-filing cure costs, and whether Court approval of the RVO would risk clawbacks underWEPPA.

On pre-filing cure costs, the Court held that, if a Receiver retains an executory contract (in this case, Crown mineral leases), monetary defaults must also be cured. In other words, if a Receiver decides to keep a contract, it must keep both the benefits and burdens of that contract.

On potential WEPPA clawbacks, Employment Canada had argued that, since the restructured company would emerge from receivership via the proposed RVO, this might subject employees to potential WEPP payment clawbacks. The Court rejected the notion that RVO approval should trigger any WEPP clawbacks, since WEPP entitlement is assessed at employment termination and is not altered by later transaction structuring. As a result, clawbacks in such circumstances would be inappropriate.

Leave to appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was not sought.

Arrangement relatif à 7037163 Canada inc. (and Varennes Cellulosic Ethanol LP)

(Québec)

2025 QCCS 4498

2025 QCCA 1560 (granting leave to appeal)

What are the limits of judicial discretion in granting third-party releases in the context of a proposed RVO?

The CCAA parties sought approval of an RVO and a separate Release Order that included broad third-party releases. Unsecured creditors objected to both the RVO and the scope of the proposed releases.

The RVO was opposed on the basis that the structure risked inadequate protection of a creditor’s intellectual property embedded in retained equipment. The Québec Superior Court resolved this by requiring the purchaser to provide an undertaking recorded in the court minutes as a condition of the RVO’s approval.

In evaluating the Release Order, the Court emphasized that broad releases should not be automatic, nor third-party releases commonplace, and the evaluating court must consider the contribution of the benefitting parties to the restructuring process. The Court found that the proposed releasees were “instrumental” in the restructuring - remaining engaged in preserving the project and carrying it through the SISP - even though many did not benefit from the KERP.

Importantly, the releases were not a condition precedent in the purchase agreement and the Release Order was segregated so that the Court would retain discretion to modify it in light of creditor concerns. In providing its approval, the Court amended the proposed release order to add a carve out for claims that (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors. However, the Court declined to comment on whether the claims of the contesting creditors would fall within this exception.

Leave to appeal to the Québec Court of Appeal was granted on December 1, 2025. As of August 24, 2026, the appeal has not yet been scheduled.

HealthHub Patient Engagement Solutions Inc. (Re)

(Nova Scotia)

Monitor’s Website

Whether a ResidualCo can be “deemed” by the Court to be the former employer of certain employees for the purpose of enabling WEPP claims?

Yes (subject to appeal).

On December 19, 2025, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia approved an RVO that “deemed” the ResidualCo to be the former employer of certain employees for the purposes of termination pay and severance pay pursuant to WEPPA. This order would permit such employees to apply for WEPP immediately following the closing of the RVO.

On December 29, 2025, the Attorney General of Canada filed a notice of appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing that the judge exceeded the Court’s jurisdiction by creating alternate facts by “deeming” the ResidualCo to be the former employer of the terminated employees and then treating it as meeting WEPP criteria, which is contrary to the statute and its purpose.

On March 5, 2026, the Attorney General of Canada amended its Notice of Appeal to add a request for leave to appeal.

The appeal is scheduled to be heard on September 16, 2026.

Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. Conacher Kingston Holdings Inc.

(Ontario)

2025 ONCA 732

Endorsement 1

Endorsement 2

Can the Court re-open a bidding process to consider a late, but substantially higher offer, instead of approving the Receiver’s accepted agreement with the appellant?

Yes.

A Receiver was appointed over a Toronto property, and after an extensive marketing process, the Receiver accepted the appellant’s offer, subject only to court approval.

The day before the Sale Approval hearing, a related party of the Debtor tabled offers 6.7% and 14% higher than the appellant’s offer. The motion judge adjourned the matter because of this late activity. Before the adjourned return, the related party submitted a third offer, 37% higher than the appellant’s offer.

At the Sale Approval hearing, the Receiver continued to support the appellant’s offer but recognized that, given the percentage increase of the third offer, which it disclosed to the Court, the Court could order a further auction process.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and ordered a six‑day re‑opened auction among the bidders, with a condition that the related party reimburse the appellant’s reasonable legal costs if the appellant did not prevail.

The original bidder appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

On appeal, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision to re-open the bidding process. It noted that the magnitude of the late offer (37% higher) justified re-opening the auction to ensure creditors received the best value. As a result, the Court extended the auction process by 48-hours to allow the bidders additional time to submit offers.

The Court also held that the Receiver did not breach confidentiality by disclosing the percentage differences between the bids to the Court. The Receivership Order explicitly provided that the Receiver had discretion to disclose information regarding the property and the receivership, and disclosing the percentage differences between the offers to the Court was reasonable to allow the Court to determine whether to re-open the bidding process.

The time period for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has lapsed. Leave was not sought.

Spartan Delta Corp. v. Alberta (Energy and Minerals)

(Alberta)

2025 ABCA 181 (granting leave to appeal)

2026 ABCA 214 (judgment on appeal)

Does a court-approved CCAA Approval and Vesting Order prevent a creditor from claiming pre-filing royalty arrears from solvent co-lessee third parties?

Yes.

The chambers judge found that the creditor’s claims for pre-filing royalty arrears against the co-lessees were barred for three reasons:

1. the clear terms of the Vesting Order prevented such claims;

2. allowing the creditor to pursue these claims would undermine the integrity and finality of the insolvency process, which is designed to centralize and resolve all claims against the debtor; and

3. the relevant statute (the Mines and Minerals Act) did not provide a basis for the creditor to pursue these claims after the Vesting Order.

The Alberta Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, recognizing that the issue is significant for both insolvency and energy law practice.

On June 24, 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the chambers judge's order in full. In particular, the Court of Appeal agreed with the chambers judge that certain provisions of the Vesting Order expressly encompassed royalty claims—including those not yet quantified at the time of the order—and barred the creditor from pursuing pre-filing royalty arrears against co-lessees.

Further, the Court of Appeal held that the statutory liability of co-lessees under the Mines and Minerals Act is joint, and not joint and several, referring to a companion decision (Alberta (Energy and Minerals) v Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2026 ABCA 213). The Court of Appeal reasoned that because joint liability is indivisible, once the liability of one jointly liable co-lessee was extinguished by the Vesting Order, no claim remained available against the other co-lessees, unless one of the limited statutory exceptions applied. Neither exception applied in this case.

As of August 24, 2026, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has not been sought.

Laliberté v. Québec Revenue Agency

(British Columbia)

2025 BCCA 406

SCC Case No. 42181

Did the CCAA stay of proceedings bar Québec penal proceedings against the operating mind of the Debtor such that his conviction should be set aside?

No (subject to leave to appeal).

Laliberté sought leave to appeal an order dismissing an application to set aside a penal conviction under the Québec Tax Administration Act. He argued that the penal conviction was contrary to a stay order issued by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in the context of a CCAA proceeding.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal for several reasons. Among other things, the Court of Appeal held that a CCAA stay does not extend to penal or criminal proceedings and only applied to civil actions. Section 11.1 of the CCAA expressly preserves the ability of public prosecutors to continue criminal/penal enforcement.

Moreover, different entities were involved in the Québec penal case and the CCAA proceeding. The ARIO stayed proceedings against the CCAA petitioners and their directors only in respect of obligations of the CCAA petitioners – it did not provide a blanket shield from penal liability tied to different companies.

Laliberté filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on January 12, 2026. As of August 24, 2026, the application for leave to appeal remains pending.

Dematic Limited c. Atallah Group Inc.

(Québec)

2025 QCCS 4430

2025 QCCA 1649 (granting leave to appeal)

2026 QCCA 959 (judgment on appeal)

Does a debtor have an obligation to disclose its impending insolvency in negotiations to settle a contractual dispute?

No. On these facts, the duty of good faith under the Civil Code of Québec did not require the debtor to disclose its impending insolvency during settlement negotiations.

The debtor got into a dispute with a key supplier and settlement discussions took place over several months. Several hours after a settlement was allegedly agreed to, a CCAA application was filed by the debtor’s creditors.

When the debtor applied to the CCAA Court to have the settlement approved, the supplier opposed, arguing that no binding settlement existed, or alternatively, that its consent was vitiated by the debtor’s fraudulent concealment of its insolvency and bad faith.

The Court granted the application and found that approval was appropriate relief under the circumstances but that neither execution of the transaction—which would have required, among other things, the immediate payment of $10 million—nor provisional execution of the judgment was necessary.

In its reasons, the Court recognized that under the Civil Code of Québec there is a contractual duty of good faith “exists at all stages of a contractual relationship” and can give rise to a duty to inform in certain circumstances. The Court held that there is no general duty for contractual counterparties to disclose their financial difficulties and recognized that such disclosure could make it very difficult for an insolvent party to enter contracts or settle contractual disputes.

The supplier appealed from the CCAA Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal found no manifest error in that decision and dismissed the appeal. As of August 24, 2026, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has not been sought.

Unity Health Toronto v. 2442931 Ontario Inc.

(Ontario)

2026 ONCA 82

SCC Case No. 42288

Does an order lifting a receivership stay to permit termination of a project agreement give rise to an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA?

No.

A panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed a single judge’s decision that an order lifting the stay was not appealable as of right and that leave to appeal should be denied.

The Court of Appeal held that the order lifting the stay was procedural in nature. Even though the effect of the stay was to allow a party to terminate a project agreement, the order itself did not terminate the agreement and was not substantive.

Similarly, the order did not directly bring property worth more than $10,000 into play. Although the order might deny the appellant a chance to pursue the payment it seeks under the project agreement, it did not deny the payment itself. Nor did the order lifting the stay directly result in a loss to the appellant. The appellant would still need to succeed on other issues because it could establish its entitlement to any payment under the project agreement.

The Court of Appeal also reaffirmed that also held that a panel may review a single judge’s refusal to grant leave under section 193(e) only in exceptional circumstances. No such circumstances were present here.

The appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. On July 30, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the application.